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Friends and Families of Psychiatric Survivors of Wisconsin
Wisconsin's "Fifth Standard", Section 51.20 (1)(a)2.e., Wisconsin Statutes

Also, see the sad decision of the Wisconsin Supreme Court upholding the "constitutionality" of this utter nonsense.

For an individual, other than an individual who is alleged to be drug dependent or developmentally disabled, after the advantages and disadvantages of and alternatives to accepting a particular medication or treatment have been explained to him or her and because of mental illness, evidences either incapability of expressing an understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives, or substantial incapability of applying an understanding of the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or her mental illness in order to make an informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment; and evidences a substantial probability, as demonstrated by both the individual's treatment history and his or her recent acts or omissions, that the individual needs care or treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration and a substantial probability that he or she will, if left untreated, lack services necessary for his or her health or safety and suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss of the individual's ability to function independently in the community or the loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her thoughts or actions.  The probability of suffering severe mental, emotional, or physical harm is not substantial under this subd. 2. e. if reasonable provision for the individual's care or treatment is available in the community and there is a reasonable probability that the individual will avail himself or herself of these services or if the individual is appropriate for protective placement under s. 55.06.  Food, shelter, or other care that is provided to an individual who is substantially incapable of obtaining food, shelter, or other care for himself or herself by any person other than a treatment facility does not constitute reasonable provision for the individual's care or treatment in the community under this subd. 2. e.  The individual's status as a minor does not automatically establish a substantial probability of suffering severe mental, emotional, or physical harm under this subd. 2. e.
 
The red-lettered, underlined items are links to the full text of the Wisconsin Statutes cited. However, the bound volumes are the only official version.

To your left, you are seeing the full (but not official---only the bound volumes are) text of Wisconsin's infamous "Fifth Standard" for involuntary commitment, 51.20 (1)(a) 2. e. of the Wisconsin Statutes.

There are so many things wrong with this paragraph, it's hard to know where to begin.

Let's look at the phrase, "expression of understanding." According to the statute, such an expression would be required of potential "clients". (Such clients are really normal, healthy people who are being turned into patients against their wills. But, I digress.)

About this phrase requiring an "expression".

Well, if you don't say anything, you're not expressing an understanding, right?

Such an expression cannot be required by statute. That is one of the fundamental rights of all American citizens-------the right to refuse to testify against oneself.

But, Chapter 51 is a civil, not a criminal, matter. In a civil matter, the only penalty for not speaking is that the court can interpret the lack of an answer as adversely as possible to the non-speaker. (We didn't explain that very clearly. The idea is this:  If the question in a civil case is, "Did you make that insurance payment on time?" and if the answer is silence, then the court can interpret that as meaning the non-speaker did not make the insurance payment on time.)

So, the idea here is that, since this is a civil case, if you remain silent regarding your understanding, then you lose, so to speak, and the court  interprets your silence as a lack of the required expression of understanding. So, you thus become a fit subject for commitment under the "fifth standard".

BUT, in this civil matter, unlike other civil matters, you are being divested of the right to control your own body and mind. Indeed, you are being divested of your own thoughts.

For that reason, it seems that there should be more of the safeguards of a criminal matter. In Lessard v. Schmidt (cite, link), the United States Supreme Court, in fact, declared that indeed, those who were involuntarily confined for psychiatric reasons were entitled to due process, as in a criminal matter. (Mr. Kenneth Kress, in his amicus curiae brief to the Wisconsin Supreme Court in this matter, declares that Lessard v. Schmidt is no longer binding. Maybe that's what he thinks.)

The due process afforded to defendants in Chapter 51 matters is not meaningful, at least not here in Dane County.

In order to find out just how unmeaningful the due process is in this county, just look at the dismissal rate.

But, no, we can't do that, because of "confidentiality."

"Confidentiality" is only used to protect the perpetrators. It's never used to protect the victims. Anybody inside the system who wants information about a particular person's medical history can always get it.

It goes back to the matter of whose story will be told and heard.

This statute requires an "expression of  understanding" on the part of the defendant. But, the U.S. Supreme Court said, in its Lessard v. Schmidt, 379 F.Supp. 1376, 1381 (E.D. Wis. 1974), vacated and remanded on other grounds, 421 U.S. 957 (1975), reinstated 413 F.Supp. 1318 (E.D. Wis. 1976)decision, said that the defendant in a commitment proceeding has the right to remain silent.

Unfortunately, Wisconsin does not keep records of debates on the floor of the legislature. The Legislative Reference Bureau does hold some records on the history of a statute, but it can sometimes be sketchy. We need to know who's saying what in our legislature.